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Thane, Sara, B.A., December 2014                                                                         Political Science 
Comparing the Campaign Financing Patterns of Male and Female Congressional Candidates 
Faculty Mentor: Professor Christopher Muste 
 Nearly 100 years after gaining the right to vote, women are nowhere near reaching equal 
representation in the United States Congress. Although this is likely due to a range of factors, the 
possibility that women remain underrepresented because of a campaign financing disadvantage 
is explored in this research. While there is a rich body of literature comparing how male and 
female congressional candidates finance their campaigns, previous research has not compared 
the net worth of male and female members of Congress or how net worth affects the amount of 
campaign receipts a candidate receives.  Additionally, the self-financing patterns of male and 
female candidates and the effect of self-financing on campaign success for each gender have not 
been explored.  
 This research addresses these gaps in the campaign finance literature by testing the 
following four hypotheses: female members of Congress have lower net worth than male 
members, wealthy members are able to capture a larger amount of campaign receipts than less 
wealthy members, female candidates rely on self-financing more than male candidates, and 
females who self-finance earn a lower percentage of the general election vote than male self-
financing candidates. My analysis reveals that a member’s net worth is positively correlated with 
campaign receipts, so I can accept my second hypothesis. However, I must reject the other three 
hypotheses and conclude that women do not appear to be at a significant campaign financing 
disadvantage when net worth and self-financing are considered.   
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Introduction 
Nearly 100 years after gaining the right to vote, women remain severely underrepresented 
in the United States Congress. As of January 2014, women hold 99 seats in the national 
legislature (CAWP, 2014). Although this is the highest number in history, it is still only 18.5% of 
the 535 congressional seats (CAWP, 2014). The implications of women’s underrepresentation 
are numerous and complex. How can the U.S. Congress make decisions on behalf of all 
Americans if its membership does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American 
population? How can American women be sure that their unique interests and needs are being 
considered if few women are at the decision making table?  
Previous research investigating the behavior of women in the United States House of 
Representatives concludes that female members are more likely than males to initiate legislation 
focused on women’s issues (Gerrity, Osborn, & Mendez, 2007). Additionally, “The presence of 
women in the legislature can substantially influence the items on the legislative agenda, policy 
outcomes, and the tone of debate in government” (Bauer, 2013, p. 37). Because women make 
unique contributions to the legislative process, it is reasonable to assume that the lack of equal 
representation in the U.S. Congress is detrimental to the needs of American women. In order to 
make strides toward equal representation, the reasons that parity has not been reached thus far 
must be identified. A rich body of research exists that explores whether campaign financing 
differences between male and female candidates puts females at a disadvantage. However, the 
impact of male and female candidates’ net worth on campaign financing has not yet been 
explored. Neither have the self-financing patterns of male and female candidates nor how self-
financing affects vote totals for each gender.  The purpose of this research is to address these 
gaps in the campaign finance literature. 
1
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Prior Research 
The ability of candidates to successfully raise funds is critical to campaign success. 
Referencing a 1987 study by Gary Jacobson, Burrell (2003) states that, “How well candidates 
preform on election day is a direct function of how much money they raise and spend” (p. 73).  
In fact, in 93% of 2008 U.S. House races the top spender won the seat (Currinder, 2008). 
Because of this strong relationship, campaign financing by female candidates has been the focus 
of many scholars seeking to answer the question, are female candidates at a disadvantage 
compared to male candidates? According to Burrell (2003), “The conventional wisdom has been 
that women candidates have greater difficulty raising money than their male counterparts, and 
this difficulty is viewed as a major reason why more women are not in elective office” (p. 74). 
Despite this theory, there is a strong body of research that concludes that women and men are on 
an equal playing field, and in some cases women are actually able to raise more money than 
men. 
 Adams and Schreiber (2011) compare the campaign financing success of men and 
women candidates at the local level. Focusing on municipal elections in seven cities, they found 
that there are no significant differences between the backgrounds of male and female candidates, 
the sources of their campaign funds, or their electoral success rates (Adams & Schreiber, 2011).  
In examining the campaign financing patterns of candidates in local elections in Mecklenburg 
County, North Carolina from 1975-1980, Ingalls and Arrington (1991) also conclude that women 
are not disadvantaged in fundraising, spending, or receiving votes. In fact, the female candidates 
studied actually received more votes for every dollar spent than the male candidates (Ingalls & 
Arrington, 1991).  
At the national level women do not seem to be disadvantaged either. Using campaign 
finance data for major party candidates in the 1980 U.S. House general election, Schlozman and 
Uhlaner (1986) conclude that the gender of the candidate alone does not affect the amount of 
campaign receipts that he or she is able to collect. However, the fact that females are more often 
challengers than incumbents does put women at a disadvantage, as challengers of both genders 
are typically unable to gather as many contributions as incumbents are (Burrell 1994, as cited by 
Burrell 2003; Schlozman & Uhlaner, 1986). 
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While these pieces of research conclude that female candidates are not at a fundraising 
disadvantage, there are differences in how males and females fund their campaigns. The rise of 
female donor networks has altered the campaign financing landscape for female candidates, in 
many cases giving women an advantage (Burrell, 2003; Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Francia, 2001). 
Female candidates who receive support from these networks are able to raise more donations 
from individuals than male and female candidates who remain outside the network (Crespin & 
Dietz, 2010). Women’s PACs such as EMILY’s List are particularly helpful in providing early 
money to candidates, which can help them gather more contributions in the long run than those 
without seed money (Francia, 2001). However, these donor groups tend to only benefit 
Democratic women (Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Francia, 2001).  
There appear to be differences in how male and female candidates gather donations from 
individuals as well. Women tend to rely on small individual contributions to fund their 
campaigns more than men (Baker, 2006; Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Ingalls & Arrington, 1991). 
Female Democrats in particular rely on contributions from women, who often give smaller 
amounts than men (Bryner & Weber, 2013). Could women candidates’ reliance on small 
individual contributions be an advantage? While Ingalls and Arrington (1991) do not reach a 
definitive conclusion, in their study they found that “…successful women candidates appeared to 
have actively sought a broad, grass-roots approach” (p. 88). However, it has also been suggested 
that female candidates have to work harder than males, using several different fundraising 
methods and utilizing a variety of funding sources in order to fundraise equal amounts as men 
(Jenkins, 2007). In sum, although there do not seem to be significant financial advantages for 
candidates of one gender over the other, a closer look reveals that there are differences in how 
males and females finance their campaigns.  
A somewhat less explored but equally important aspect of campaign funding is self-
financing.  Candidates are not limited as to how much money they can donate or loan to their 
own campaigns (Sides, Shaw, Grossmann, & Lipsitz, 2013). That being said,  “The lack of 
spending limits means that candidates can fund their own campaigns, potentially giving wealthy 
individuals a significant advantage over the less wealthy” (Sides et al., 2013, p. 107).  Despite 
this possibility, self-financed candidates do not tend to do well on election day (Alexander, 2005; 
Boatright, 2009; Currinder, 2008; Steen, 2006). In the 2008 election, only three out of 24 U.S. 
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Senate candidates who self-financed $1 million or more won their election (Boatright, 2009). 
Incumbents rarely self-finance, while open seat candidates and challengers are more likely to do 
so (Steen, 2006).  
There are theories as to why self-financing is often associated with failure at the polls. 
Steen (2006) posits that “…self-financers tend to be inexperienced, low quality candidates, so in 
many cases their personal funds do little more than make them more competitive with their 
stronger  opponents” (p.122). Additionally, candidates who self-finance large portions of their 
total funds rather than fundraise may miss out on the benefits that fundraising brings, such as 
garnering attention from the media, (Steen, 2006) and forging relationships with voters 
(Alexander, 2005; Steen, 2006).     
Closely related to self-financing is a candidate’s personal wealth. Steen (2006) found that 
“…self-financing is positively correlated with candidate wealth” (p. 125) and that “…self-
financers are significantly wealthier than other members of Congress” (p. 15).  However, the 
wealth of a self-financing candidate does not provide him or her with a significant advantage 
since candidates who pour money into their own campaigns typically lose (Steen, 2006).  
In conclusion, prior research comparing how male and female candidates finance their 
campaigns has determined that there is not a significant difference between the total amounts 
males and females are able to raise (Adams & Schreiber 2011; Burrell, 1994 as cited by Burrell, 
2003; Ingalls & Arrington, 1991; Uhlaner & Schlozman 1986). Females rely on small individual 
contributions more than males (Baker, 2006; Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Ingalls & Arrington, 1991), 
and get an added boost from women’s PACs (Burrell, 2003; Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Francia, 
2001). Self-financers typically lose their elections (Alexander, 2005; Boatright, 2009; Currinder, 
2008; Steen, 2006), and incumbents are less likely to contribute to their own campaigns than 
challengers or open seat candidates (Steen, 2006). While the existing literature suggests that 
women do not remain underrepresented in the national legislature because of campaign 
financing, the differences between how males and females self-finance and how male and female 
self-financers fare on election day have not been considered. Neither has the net worth of female 
members compared to male members, nor how net worth is related to the amount of total receipts 
a member was able to gather during his or her campaign. Thus, until these avenues are explored 
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it is not possible to conclude that campaign financing is not affecting the level of women’s 
representation.   
Hypotheses  
The first hypothesis that will be tested is that female members of the United States House 
have a lower average net worth than male members. Because females nationwide have 
historically earned less than males, it can be expected that female representatives have an 
average net worth that is lower than males’. With lower incomes, females likely also have assets 
with less value and more liabilities. However, it is possible that female members may have equal 
or even greater net worth than male members. House candidates tend to have higher incomes 
than their constituents (Steen, 2006). The female members in question not only ran for office but 
won, suggesting that there may not be a gap between the net worth of male and female members 
of Congress as there is between the incomes of the average male and female American citizen. 
While it would be ideal to analyze the net worth of all candidates rather than just successful 
candidates, net worth data for losing candidates is not readily available.   
My second hypothesis is that wealthier members are able to collect a larger amount of 
campaign receipts than less wealthy members. Wealthier individuals are likely part of a network 
that includes other wealthy individuals. This would give wealthy candidates an advantage, as 
they would have the opportunity to solicit large individual contributions from those within the 
network. They also would be likely to have connections with corporations, PACs, and other 
organizations which could donate large sums of money to the candidate. Additionally, it is 
common knowledge that running for office is expensive and candidates who raise and spend 
more tend to be more successful (Jacobson, 1987 as cited by Burrell, 2003; Currinder, 2008). So, 
candidates with greater personal wealth may appear to be more viable to the media and potential 
donors and thus amass a larger amount of total contributions. Net worth may affect the amount 
of total campaign receipts differently for male and female candidates, so in addition to analyzing 
the effect of net worth on campaign receipts for all candidates combined, the effect of net worth 
on campaign receipts for males and females will be tested separately.  
My third hypothesis is that female candidates rely on self-financing more than male 
candidates. According to Jennifer A. Steen (2006), candidates who self-finance are typically 
Thane 7 
 
challengers or open seat candidates rather than incumbents and they are often inexperienced. 
Female candidates “have disproportionately been challengers” (Burrell, 2003, p. 79). Therefore, 
it can be expected that female candidates rely on self-financing as a larger percentage of their 
total receipts than male candidates do.  
However, It is also possible that female candidates actually self-finance less often and in 
smaller amounts than male candidates. If female candidates are less wealthy than male 
candidates, they may not be able to afford to contribute as much or as often as males. 
Additionally, females might not need to self-finance as often or as much as male candidates do. 
Females tend to benefit greatly from early money contributed by women’s donor networks, an 
advantage that male candidates do not have (Burrell, 2003; Crespin & Deitz, 2010; Francia, 
2001). Ingalls and Arrington (1991) conclude that female candidates for local offices in 
Mecklenburg County relied on self-financing less often then male candidates. This may hold true 
at the national level as well.  
Finally, my fourth hypothesis is that male candidates who self-finance capture a higher 
percentage of the vote than female candidates who self-finance. If female candidates rely on self-
financing to make up a larger percentage of their total receipts than male candidates do, it can be 
expected that self-financing female candidates are not as successful as self-financing male 
candidates. Candidates who do not self-finance large amounts gather more contributions from 
others than those who do self-finance (Steen, 2006). So, if male candidates self-finance a smaller 
percentage of their total receipts than female candidates do they are likely to earn a higher 
percentage of the general election vote than female candidates. However, it is possible that men 
and women self-financers may experience different rates of success at the polls even if there is 
not a significant difference between the raw amount or the percent that one gender self-finances 
compared to the other. One gender may benefit more from the perks of fundraising described by 
Steen (2006) and Alexander (2005), or voters may react differently to male and female self-
financers. 
Data Collection and Methods  
To test the hypotheses described above, I constructed a dataset including all 838 major 
party candidates running in the 2012 U.S. House of Representatives general election. The 
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following variables were coded for all cases in the dataset: district, region, candidate name, 
candidate status (whether the candidate was an incumbent, challenger, etc.), gender, party 
affiliation, percent of the general election vote received, and total campaign receipts. The 
absolute amount and percentage of total receipts were coded for candidate contributions, 
candidate loans, itemized individual contributions, unitemized individual contributions, other 
committees contributions, party committees contributions, and transfers from authorized 
committees. FEC financial summaries were not available for a handful of candidates, who were 
excluded from the analysis as a result. For candidates who won their elections, data was also 
collected for 2011 and 2012 net worth. Net worth data was available for 434 out of the 435 
members of the U.S. House.  
Data for candidate district, name, status, and party affiliation was retrieved from CNN 
Election Center. The congressional districts were coded into one of four geographical regions 
(West, Midwest, Northeast, and South) based on the U.S. Census Bureau regions. Candidate 
gender was determined based on the list of female candidates provided by the Center for 
American Women and Politics in “Women Congressional and Statewide Elected Executive 
Candidates 2012.” Data on the percent of the general election vote received was retrieved from 
the Federal Election Commission’s “Official Election Results for United States House of 
Representatives.” All campaign finance data was collected using the Federal Election 
Commission’s financial summaries found using the “Candidate and Committee Viewer” search 
feature. Net worth data for 2011 and 2012 was collected from the Center for Responsive Politics, 
which uses the financial disclosure reports filed by members of Congress to calculate these 
figures. Net worth was collected for members only, rather than all House candidates in the 
dataset, because net worth data for unsuccessful candidates is not readily available. Complete 
citations of all data sources are listed in Appendix A.  
Analysis 
The hypothesis that female members have lower average net worth than male members 
was tested first. A total of 434 cases were included in this analysis, 78 females and 356 males. 
Net worth data was not available for one member of the House. Additionally, 2011 data was 
available for Representative Jackson Jr. but 2012 data was not. As a result, Jackson Jr.’s 2012 net 
worth was recorded as missing, and the 2011 value was used as his 2011-2012 average. I ran a 
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comparison of means and t-test equality of means to determine whether or not there is a 
difference in net worth for male and female representatives, and if so, whether this difference is 
statistically significant.  
The results of these tests indicate that females do have a lower net worth than males. The 
mean net worth for female members stayed relatively constant between 2011 and 2012 but the 
mean net worth for males decreased by roughly $.8 million during the same period. In 2011 male 
members had an average net worth that was about $1.7 million higher than female members. 
This difference between males and females shrunk to $840,370   in 2012. Because some 
members’ net worth increased or decreased significantly between 2011 and 2012, I averaged the 
2011 and 2012 net worth values for each member. I did so in order to gain a more general 
measure of each candidate’s individual wealth and the wealth of members as a whole. Looking at 
this 2011-2012 average net worth figure, male members’ mean net worth came in at $1.26 
million more than the female members’ mean. However, the t-tests show that the differences in 
means for males and females are not statistically significant. The p-values for 2011 (p=.712), 
2012 (p=.813) and 2011-2012 average (p=.750) are all quite high (a p-value of .05 or lower is the 
general standard for statistical significance).  
 
Member Net Worth 
 
Candidate Gender N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 
Mean 
Member Net Worth 2011 
M 356 7564566.85 40062311.914 2123298.285 
F 78 5862473.08 15096374.821 1709327.851 
Member Net Worth 2012 
M 355 6736774.93 30577327.854 1622876.058 
F 78 5896405.13 15025509.356 1701303.917 
Member Net Worth 2011-
2012 Average 
M 
356 7141630.4775 34292685.75064 1817508.70977 
F 
78 5879439.1026 15047828.07395 1703831.01419 
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In order to address the possibility that there could be differences in net worth between 
parties or among geographical regions,  I ran a comparison of means and t-test for the variable 
“member net worth 2011-2012 average” with party affiliation as the grouping variable, and an 
ANOVA with region as the grouping variable. While the mean net worth of Republican 
members is $2.28 million higher than Democrats, this difference is not statistically significant 
(p=.455).  Regional differences exist as well. Members in the Midwest have a net worth of $2.71 
million, the lowest of the four regions. Representatives in the West have the highest net worth, a 
mean of $11.87 million. Falling in the middle are the South with a mean of $7.02 million, and 
the Northeast with a mean of $5.26 million. Although these differences seem remarkable, 
particularly between the Midwest and the West, the results of the ANOVA show that these 
differences are not statistically significant (p=.225).  
In sum, I cannot accept my hypothesis because the difference in mean net worth of males 
and females is not statistically significant. However, as I predicted in my hypothesis, male 
members on average are wealthier than female members. While there are differences in net 
worth between parties and across regions, these differences are not statistically significant either.  
The net worth of a member of Congress is only important if it affects the way a member 
legislates or the success of his or her campaign. As noted in the literature review at the beginning 
of this paper, wealth and self-financing are positively correlated (Steen, 2006), so in this way 
wealth influences a candidate’s campaign strategy. Does personal wealth also affect the total 
amount of money a candidate can raise? My second hypothesis is that the net worth of U.S. 
House members and the total campaign receipts they collected during the two-year 2012 election 
cycle are positively correlated. To test this, I recoded “2011-2012 average net worth” into a new 
variable with two categories, “below mean” and “above mean.” I then ran a comparison of 
means and t-test to determine whether the mean total campaign receipts collected in the 2012 
election cycle differs for members with net worth above and below the mean. Once again, my 
sample size was 434.  After comparing the means it is clear that wealthier members were able to 
capture more campaign money. Members with a net worth below the mean averaged $1,628,822 
in campaign contributions, and those with a net worth above the mean averaged $2,205,361. The 
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results of the t-test show that, with a p-value of .026, the difference is statistically significant at 
the p=.05 level.  
Recoding 2011-2012 average net worth into quartiles yields similar results. The mean 
total campaign receipts increase from the first through the third quartiles (Q1=$1,386,671, 
Q2=1,537,004, Q3=1,731,814) with a jump between quartile three and four (Q4=2,149,437). The 
ANOVA test reveals that there is a statistically significant difference (p=.011) between the mean 
total campaign receipts received when net worth is divided into quartiles. In order to identify 
where this difference occurs, I ran a Scheffe post-hoc test. The statistically significant difference 
lies only in the full range between the first and fourth quartiles (p=.020).  Although there is a 
jump between quartile three and four, this difference is not statistically significant.  
After comparing the means, I performed a Chi-Square test as well as a Pearson 
Correlation to test the strength and direction of the relationship between net worth and total 
campaign receipts. For the Chi-Square test I split both net worth and total campaign receipts at 
the mean. This test yielded a p-value of .030, demonstrating that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between net worth and total campaign receipts at the p=.05 level. In contrast, the 
correlation did not meet the p=.05 level of significance. With a Pearson Correlation coefficient of 
.069 and a p-value of .153, the relationship between net worth and total campaign receipts is 
positive, but not strong enough to fully reject the null hypothesis that net worth and campaign 
receipts are not correlated.   
While there appears to be a relationship between net worth and total campaign receipts, 
does this relationship hold when the data is separated according to gender? Using the same mean 
and quartile breaks determined when all candidates were combined, I split the data according to 
gender and ran comparison of means tests. Surprisingly, there is still a relationship between net 
worth and campaign receipts for male representatives but not for females. The mean total 
receipts for females with a net worth below the mean is $1.98 million, compared to $1.96 million 
for females with a net worth above the mean. These two values are virtually equal (p=.982). 
When splitting females into quartiles based on net worth, there was once again no statistically 
significant difference between the means (p=.713). The sample size of females with a net worth 
below the mean is 10, and above the mean is 68, however the means are so close together that 
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even with a large sample size the difference would not be significant. Clearly, for female 
candidates net worth is not related to fundraising totals. 
Males with a net worth below the mean (N=311) had a mean of $1.55 million in total 
receipts while males with above average net worth (N=45) had a mean of $2.26 million in 
receipts. This difference is statistically significant with a p-value of .004. When splitting the 
males into quartiles based on net worth, the differences between the first and fourth quartile 
(p=.002), second and fourth quartile (p=.023), and third and fourth quartile (p=.022) are 
statistically significant. Although net worth is not related to campaign fundraising for females, a 
strong relationship exists for male candidates. Male candidates with more wealth gather more 
campaign receipts. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between net worth and total campaign 
receipts, I created the scatterplot below: 
 
There are four obvious outliers, two on the dependent variable and two on the independent 
variable. Additionally, there is a borderline outlier on the independent variable at just over $200 
million. Interested in determining whether the relationships described above hold true when 
these outliers are removed, I decided to eliminate cases where campaign receipts totaled $20 
million or more, or net worth exceeded $300 million. I decided to keep the case that looks to be a 
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marginal outlier, with a net worth a little over $200 million. I kept this case in order to retain as 
much data as possible and because it was not clearly removed from the rest of the data as the 
other four cases were. The new scatterplot without the outliers is below:  
 
Next, I ran a correlation between member average net worth 2011-2012 and total campaign 
receipts, both genders combined, with outliers excluded. 
Member Net Worth and Total Campaign Receipts Correlations 
 
Member Net Worth 
2011-2012 Average 
Total 
Campaign Receipts 
Member Net Worth 2011-2012 
Average 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .231
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 430 430 
Total Campaign Receipts Pearson 
Correlation 
.231
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 430 781 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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With the outliers removed there is a strong, positive relationship between net worth and total 
campaign receipts. Once again I split the data according to gender and ran correlations. With the 
outliers removed, the relationship between net worth and total campaign receipts is statistically 
significant (for females this relationship is slightly weaker than for males).  
Member Net Worth and Total Campaign Receipts Correlations 
Candidate Gender 
Member Net 
Worth 2011-
2012 Average 
Total Campaign 
Receipts 
F Member Net Worth 2011-
2012 Average 
Pearson Correlation 1 .276
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .015 
N 77 77 
Total Campaign Receipts Pearson Correlation .276
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .015  
N 77 158 
M Member Net Worth 2011-
2012 Average 
Pearson Correlation 1 .222
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 353 353 
Total Campaign Receipts Pearson Correlation .222
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 353 623 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
          
In conclusion, the relationship between a member of Congress’ net worth and the 
amount of campaign funds he or she collects is present both when outliers are included and 
excluded (when males and females are combined), however it is much stronger without the 
outliers. When the outliers are included, the relationship is basically nonexistent for females 
alone, but once these outliers are removed it is quite strong for both genders. Of the four outliers 
I eliminated three were males. However, one was Michelle Bachmann. Bachmann was able to 
amass nearly $26 million in funds for her 2012 House re-election bid but her net worth was not 
so extraordinary. This is likely related to her run for President. Because the sample size for 
Thane 16 
 
females was relatively small Bachmann’s presence had a large effect on the correlation. 
Eliminating her and the other three outliers allows for a more accurate picture of the relationship.   
 In testing hypothesis one, I determined that there is not a statistically significant 
difference between the net worth of male and female members. However, males elected to the 
House in 2012 were wealthier than their female counterparts. If this relationship holds true for all 
male and female congressional candidates, including unsuccessful candidates, females may be at 
a disadvantage. As the results of the tests for hypothesis two indicate, when outliers are removed 
net worth is positively correlated with campaign receipts for males and females separately as 
well as candidates of both genders combined. So, if all female candidates beyond only those who 
are successfully elected tend have a lower net worth than males, we can expect that they would 
generally gather a smaller amount of campaign receipts. The gender differences in fundraising 
may be even sharper among unsuccessful candidates. As noted in the literature review, typically 
the candidate who spends the most wins (Burrell, 2003; Currinder, 2008), so it is possible that 
having a lower net worth compared to males could put female candidates at a disadvantage.  
My third hypothesis is that female candidates rely on self-financing more than male 
candidates do. Cases included all major party candidates running in the 2012 U.S. House general 
elections. For the Louisiana districts I included only the candidates who earned the highest and 
second highest percentage of the vote, since more than two candidates are permitted to run in the 
Louisiana general elections. My sample included 785 cases, 626 males and 159 females. While 
my original dataset includes separate variables for candidate contributions and candidate loans, 
for the purposes of this analysis these were combined into two variables, “self-financing absolute 
amount” and “self-financing percent of total receipts.” Once again, I ran a comparison of means 
and t-test on this data.  
The results of my data analysis show that counter to my hypothesis, males actually self-
financed more than females in absolute dollars and as a percentage of total receipts. The mean 
amount self-financed by males in the 2012 election cycle was $61,929, the mean amount self-
financed by females was $52,469. As a percentage of their total campaign contributions, males 
self-financed a mean of 9.04% compared to 7.8% for females. However, the difference in the 
mean absolute amounts is not statistically significant (p=.695), and neither is the difference in the 
percent of total receipts (p=.473). 
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 After finding no significant differences in the mean percentages of total receipts and 
absolute amounts that male and female candidates self-finance, I created a new variable by 
multiplying the percentage and absolute values of self-financing for each case. This new variable 
was created in an attempt to minimize the effects of two types of candidates: those who raise a 
small amount of total receipts but self-finance a large portion of their receipts, and those who 
raise a large amount of total receipts and self-finance a small percentage (but large raw amount) 
of their total receipts.  I performed a comparison of means and t-test for this new variable. The 
mean value for males is $3,020,684 versus $2,106,379 for females. The difference between these 
values is not statistically significant (p=.558), reaffirming the conclusion that male and female 
candidates do not differ in their reliance on self-financing.  
Suspecting that candidate status may influence a candidate’s likelihood of self-financing 
more than gender does, I ran a regression with candidate status as the independent variable and 
self-financing as a percent of total campaign receipts as the dependent variable. I held out 
“incumbents” as the comparison variable for the regression. I removed one case from the dataset 
that had a candidate status of “open seat/unopposed” in order to make it possible to run the test. 
Regression: Candidate Status and Total Campaign Receipts 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
1 .422
a
 .178 .174 17.64953 1.967 
a. Predictors: (Constant), I/I, I/Unopposed, Open, Challenger 
b. Dependent Variable: Self-Financing Percent of Total Receipts 
 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 
Regression 52473.903 4 13118.476 42.113 .000
b
 
Residual 242663.086 779 311.506   
Total 295136.989 783    
a. Dependent Variable: Self-Financing Percent of Total Receipts 
b. Predictors: (Constant), I/I, I/Unopposed, Open, Challenger 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) .504 .966  .522 .602 
Challenger 17.933 1.414 .447 12.682 .000 
Open 10.389 1.908 .189 5.444 .000 
I/Unopposed 1.514 3.221 .016 .470 .638 
I/I 2.396 5.664 .014 .423 .672 
a. Dependent Variable: Self-Financing Percent of Total Receipts 
 
The results of this regression show that candidate status is a good predictor of the percent 
of total funds a candidate will self-finance. Challengers self-financed 17.933% more of their total 
receipts than incumbents did, and open seat candidates self-financed 10.389% more of their total 
receipts than incumbents did. The difference between the percentage incumbents and challengers 
self-financed is statistically significant (p=.000), so is the difference between the percentage that 
incumbents and open seat candidates self-financed (p=.000). While the sample sizes for 
challengers (N=292), incumbents (N=334), and open seats candidates (N=115) are moderate, it is 
important to note that the sample sizes for unopposed incumbents (N=33) and incumbents 
running against incumbents (N=10) are quite small, so it would not be sensible to draw 
conclusions about these two categories based on this test. Even so, the percentage difference with 
incumbents is extremely small.  These results are consistent with Steen’s (2006) conclusion that 
challengers and open seat candidates self-finance more than incumbents.  
My final hypothesis is that male candidates who self-finance capture a higher percentage 
of the vote than female candidates who self-finance. My theory behind this hypothesis is that, 
since self-financing is equated with electoral failure (Alexander, 2005; Boatright, 2009; 
Currinder, 2008; Steen, 2006), if females rely on self-financing as a larger portion of their total 
receipts than males they will be less successful than male self-financers at the polls. The analysis 
of hypothesis three clearly indicates that females do not rely on self-financing more than male 
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candidates. In fact, although not statistically significant, males self-finance more in absolute 
dollars and as a percent of total receipts. Although these results seem to undercut the fourth 
hypothesis, it is still possible that self-financing could affect vote totals differently for male and 
female candidates.  
To test this hypothesis I selected high self-financers. I first ran a frequency of the “self-
financing” variable. Out of 785 candidates included in the dataset, 460 self-financed less than 
.1% of their total receipts. I cut the remaining candidates in half, splitting them into “low self-
financers” (.1%-9.5%) and “high self-financers” (9.51%-highest value). Considering only the 
high self-financers, I regressed the percent of the vote received in the general election on the 
percent of total receipts self-financed, comparing women to men. The results of this regression 
show that women who self-finance more than 9.5% of their total receipts earn a slightly higher 
percent of the vote than men (40.056% compared to 38.999%), but this difference is not 
statistically significant.   
Regression: Self-Financing and Percent of the General Election Vote Received 
Model Summary 
Model 
R 
R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Self-Financers 
Percent =  1.00 
(Selected) 
1 .034
a
 .001 -.005 12.49879 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Women Self-Financers Percent 
 
ANOVA
a,b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 28.759 1 28.759 .184 .668
c
 
Residual 25151.384 161 156.220   
Total 25180.143 162    
a. Dependent Variable: Percent of Vote Received 
b. Selecting only cases for which Self-Financers Percent =  1.00 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Women Self-Financers Percent 
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Coefficients
a,b
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 38.999 1.092  35.713 .000 
Women Self-Financers 
Percent 
1.057 2.465 .034 .429 .668 
a. Dependent Variable: Percent of Vote Received 
b. Selecting only cases for which Self-Financers Percent =  1.00 
 
To determine whether or not this conclusion holds true when considering raw dollars 
self-financed instead of the percent of total receipts, I ran a frequency of absolute dollar amount 
self-financed. Once again I split the data into three groups, those who did not self-finance at all, 
those who self-financed less than $16,939, and candidates who self-financed $16,939 or more. 
Only testing the “high self-financing” group, I regressed the percent of the vote earned on dollars 
self-financed for women compared to men. Once again, the difference between the votes male 
and female high self-financers received is not statistically significant. Women received 45.915% 
of the vote compared to men’s 46.706%.  
In order to definitively conclude that self-financing does not affect electoral success 
differently for male and female candidates, I ran three final regressions on the combined percent 
of receipts and raw dollars variable. Separating this combined variable data into “non-self-
financers,” “low self-financers,” and “high self-financers” I regressed the percent of the vote 
received on each level of self-financing separately, comparing women and men. The differences 
in the percent of the vote received for males compared to females in each of the three categories 
were not statistically significant. In conclusion, I can reject both hypotheses three and four. 
Female candidates do not rely on self-financing more than male candidates, and females who do 
self-finance do not fare worse at the polls than males who self-finance. This is good news for 
women interested in running for office. Because self-financers are often less viable candidates 
and not as successful at fundraising (Alexander, 2005; Steen, 2006), the fact that women are not 
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relying on self-financing more than men is a promising sign. It demonstrates that women are just 
as viable and can be just as successful at fundraising as their male counterparts.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this research was to determine whether women’s continued 
underrepresentation can be partially explained by campaign financing disadvantages. While there 
is a consensus among previous research that women are not at a financial disadvantage compared 
to men (Adams & Schreiber 2011; Burrell, 1994 as cited by Burrell, 2003; Schlozman & 
Uhlaner, 1986) and are sometimes at an advantage in financing their campaigns (Burrell, 2003; 
Crespin & Dietz, 2010; Francia, 2001; Ingalls & Arrington, 1991), differences in males’ and 
females’ net worth and self-financing had not yet been explored.  
 This research establishes a strong base for further comparisons of net worth and self-
financing between males and females. It was determined that the difference in the mean net 
worth of male and female members of Congress in 2012 is not statistically significant, although 
men are wealthier than women. To explore this in more depth, future research could aim to 
compare the net worth of male and female members of Congress over the course of several 
sessions. This would make it possible to see whether or not the gap between the net worth of 
male and female members has expanded or contracted. Alternatively, the net worth of all male 
and female general election candidates for the U.S. House, rather than just members, could be 
studied. It is possible that the net worth of male and female members does not differ significantly 
because they have already passed the election hurdle, but that it does differ for candidates 
running in primaries and general elections. I did not expand my sample to include all candidates 
in this research because net worth data was not available for all candidates, only for those who 
won their election. It is possible to calculate net worth for all candidates based on their financial 
disclosure reports, but based on the test cases I coded it would be very time consuming to do so.  
 Arguably the most interesting result of this research is that, consistent with my second 
hypothesis, personal wealth is positively correlated with the amount of campaign receipts a 
candidate can collect. When outliers are removed this holds true for all members combined as 
well as when members are split according to gender. Steen (2006) concluded that personal 
wealth does not give self-financers an advantage, because spending large amounts of their own 
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money typically has negative consequences. However, the results of my research suggest that 
wealthy candidates may have an advantage in raising campaign funds. Considering that the 
candidate with the largest war chest tends to win the election (Currinder, 2008; Jacobson, 1987 
as cited by Burrell, 2003), and wealthier candidates are able to raise more campaign funds than 
less wealthy candidates, those with more personal money may have an advantage. Although this 
theory cannot be tested with my dataset because net worth was only included for winning 
candidates, it does provide an opportunity for future research. The relationships between the net 
worth of all candidates, both successful and unsuccessful, the amount of total campaign receipts 
collected, and the percent of the vote received, could be analyzed to determine whether this 
theory is accurate.  
 While my third hypothesis stated that female candidates rely on self-financing more than 
male candidates, my analysis reveals that this is not the case. Male candidates actually self-
finance larger raw dollar amounts then females and rely on self-financing as a larger percentage 
of their total campaign funds. However, these gender differences are not statistically significant. 
This is good news for potential female candidates, as it likely means that women are able to 
fundraise successfully and do not need to rely on their own funds in order to be competitive. For 
those females who do choose to self-finance, they do not experience different success rates than 
men who self-finance. According to Steen (2006), a large number of self-financing candidates do 
not make it past the primaries. Future research could compare the self-financing patterns of male 
and female primary election candidates and how male and female primary candidates fare in the 
primary elections. Although there do not appear to be any differences in self-financing between 
males and females in the general elections, there may be significant differences at the primary 
level.  
 These results fit with the consensus provided by previous research that women do not 
appear to be at a significant campaign fundraising disadvantage. If this is the case, why do 
women remain underrepresented in Congress? Fox and Lawless (2004) suggest that not enough 
women are running. After creating the Citizen Political Ambition Study and analyzing its results, 
they concluded that eligible female candidates are less likely to think about running and to take 
concrete steps toward starting a campaign (Fox & Lawless, 2004). Additionally, females see 
themselves as less qualified for office than men do and fewer women than men are encouraged to 
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run for office by a political figure (Fox and Lawless, 2004). The results of this study led Fox and 
Lawless (2004) to conclude that women remain underrepresented because of a difference in what 
they refer to as “political ambition.” Other scholars have similarly concluded that not enough 
women are running for office (Adams and Schreiber, 2011; Burrell, 2005) which seems to be a 
strong explanation for why women remain underrepresented. How can this ambition hurdle be 
overcome? I agree with Schlozman and Uhlaner (1986) that women who believe they will 
struggle to fundraise will refrain from running. Unfortunately, I also agree with Burrell’s (2003) 
assessment that it is a widespread belief that women are at a campaign financing disadvantage. In 
order to change this notion and prompt more women to run for public office, the research that 
strikes down this popular view must be widely publicized.  
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